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ON THE STRAIGHT AND NARROWLY TAILORED:
THE THIRD CIRCUIT WALKS A FINE LINE BETWEEN
THE JUDICIARY AND POLITICS IN ADAMS v.
GOVERNOR OF DELAWARE
INTRODUCTION
Partisanship is often an unavoidable component of the American judiciary.1 In some states, governors appoint judges with party affiliations
and partisan agendas they hope to solidify with judicial nominees who
share their ideologies.2 In others, like Pennsylvania, judges run for their
positions as party-affiliated candidates like any other politician.3 Delaware’s system, engrained in the state’s constitution, requires the governor to
appoint judges based on their political affiliation. In theory, this maintains complete partisan balance—or as close to it as possible—throughout
Delaware’s judicial system.4
In 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit declared this
policy unconstitutional because it violated a judicial candidate’s free association rights. The policy prevented an attorney from pursuing a position
as a Delaware judge because he did not belong to the required political
party.5 This Casebrief discusses the Third Circuit’s decision striking down
the relevant provisions of the Delaware constitution.
1. See Garrett Epps, Delaware’s Weird—and Constitutionally Suspect—Approach to
Judicial Independence, ATLANTIC (Mar. 28, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/
ideas/archive/2020/03/delawares-weirdand-constitutionally-suspectapproach-tojudicial-independence/608971/ [https://perma.cc/LPA6-S9FS] (arguing “[o]ne
of the persistent puzzles of American law is that no one can draw a clear line
between law and politics, or law and policy”).
2. For further discussion of states’ judicial appointment processes, see infra
Part I.
3. See How Judges Are Elected, UNIFIED JUD. SYS. PA., http://www.pacourts.us/
learn/how-judges-are-elected [https://perma.cc/QVX8-TMM6] (last visited Mar.
13, 2020). Only first-time nominees run on a political party’s ticket in Pennsylvania. See id. After being elected, they are voted on in retention elections where
the judge’s name appears on the ballot without reference to political party. Id.
4. See Adams v. Governor of Del., 922 F.3d 166, 170–71 (3d Cir. 2019) (discussing requirements of Delaware constitution as it pertains to appointment of
judges to supreme, superior, chancery, family, and common pleas courts).
5. See id. at 184–85 (holding would-be judicial candidate’s freedom of association rights were violated by Delaware’s requirement that judiciary be balanced between Democrats and Republicans, when he did not belong to political party being
recruited for that position).
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We argue that the Third Circuit’s opinion in Adams v. Governor of Delaware6 exposes the inherent flaw in the argument made by the Governor of
Delaware: that the state’s practices institutionalize partisanship rather than
eschew it. Nevertheless, we believe the court failed to comprehensively
analyze the portions of Delaware’s constitution that require political balance, choosing a shortsighted approach by primarily basing its holding on
the political affiliation provision. We also examine the ramifications of
the Third Circuit’s decision on Delaware’s place at the center of the corporate law marketplace, and contend that voluntary adherence to its tradition of bipartisan judicial appointments could help prevent the governor’s
feared repercussions of the Adams decision.
Part I of this Casebrief discusses the long history behind the constitutional provisions at issue in Adams. Part II details the challenge brought by
James Adams, a Delaware attorney and aspiring judge, whose status as a
political Independent precluded him from applying for Delaware judicial
vacancies. Part III traces the reasoning that resulted in the Third Circuit
declaring Delaware’s judicial appointment scheme unconstitutional. Part
IV argues that while the court pinpointed the major weaknesses in the
governor’s arguments, it underanalyzed the state’s interests at play and
failed to reckon with the potential consequences of its decision. Part V
examines the potential impact on Delaware’s standing at the center of
American corporate law.
I.

BACKGROUND

The provisions of the Delaware constitution at issue in Adams date
back to 1897, when the state’s general assembly called a constitutional
convention to amend the outdated Constitution of 1831.7 Delegates considered changing the judicial selection process, as worries over the injection of politics into what was commonly viewed as an insulated branch of
government grew among the Delaware public.8 Ultimately, the delegates
6. 922 F.3d 166 (3d Cir. 2019).
7. See WILLIAM W. BOYER & EDWARD C. RATLEDGE, DELAWARE POLITICS AND
GOVERNMENT 41 (2009). The Constitution of 1831 was the third governing document of Delaware and was designed to make limited changes to the Constitution of
1792. See id. at 40. While “[t]he First State” had adopted a constitution in 1776,
the ratification of the U.S. Constitution in 1789 outdated most of the original document’s common law protections. See id. Delaware designed the Constitution of
1792 to mirror that of the newly formed federal government. See id. Despite limited changes in 1831, Delaware’s constitution remained largely the same until
1897, when the state’s General Assembly determined more sweeping changes were
in order. See id. at 41.
8. See Adams, 922 F.3d at 169 (“[T]he president of the convention[ ] explained his position that the appointment of judges would enable judges to remain
free from political cronyism and partisanship . . . .”). Thirty years of Democratic
control in Delaware ended in 1897 when the state’s “electoral votes were cast for
the Republican presidential candidate, William McKinley, in 1896.” Joel Edan
Friedlander, Is Delaware’s “Other Major Political Party” Really Entitled to Half of Delaware’s Judiciary?, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 1139, 1147 (2016) (discussing political context of
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created a system of gubernatorial appointment requiring confirmation by
a majority of the state senate.9 The fears of judicial politicization, however, prompted the convention to consider a constitutional provision that
would attempt to solidify the judiciary as a “non-partisan” entity—limiting
the number of judges on the bench from one political party.10 In opposition, some noted that sweeping limitations would force the governor to
appoint a judge of a particular party with the expectation that the judge
would act upon his political inclinations, thus, crystallizing a political judiciary.11 Ultimately, the interests of preserving minority representation
and limiting majority suppression carried the day. The convention
adopted five provisions designed to balance the political representation—
and by extension, the interests—of judges on the Delaware courts.12
These provisions remained untouched until 1951, when the general assembly modified their language to exclude any non-Republican or non-

1897 in which amendments to Constitution of 1831 were made). Citizens seized
the opportunity amidst this political upheaval to demand the state address their
concerns over “political corruption and electoral fraud.” Id. at 1147. “[T]he conditions which exist in the State of Delaware today are directly traceable to the connivance of political parties, whose selfish actions and non-progressive
manifestations are wholly responsible for the state of affairs which exist there today.” Id. at 1147–48 (alteration in original) (quoting Joseph T. Walsh & Thomas J.
Fitzpatrick Jr., Judiciary Article IV: Political Balance Requirement, in THE DELAWARE
CONSTITUTION OF 1897: THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED YEARS 134, 444–48 (Harvey B.
Rubenstein ed., 1997)).
9. See Adams, 922 F.3d at 170 (noting in 1897, Delaware “was the only state in
the country in which the governor appointed judges without legislative involvement”). The governor’s unbridled appointment power had been a particular
point of contention amongst the Delaware public. See Friedlander, supra note 8, at
1148 (“Nearly four hundred offices are subject to the appointive power of the Governor, whose proportionate power is greater than that of President . . . .” (quoting
Walsh & Fitzpatrick, supra note 8, at 444–48)).
10. See Adams, 922 F.3d at 170 (discussing adoption of article IV, section 3 of
the constitution of 1897); see also Friedlander, supra note 8, at 1148–49 (“The Constitutional Convention rejected the idea of electing judges due to the ‘sense that
there was already at that time “too much politics” in the courts and that the election of judges would merely contribute to that unsatisfactory situation.’” (quoting
Walsh & Fitzpatrick, supra note 8, at 133)).
11. See Adams, 922 F.3d at 170 (discussing delegate Andrew Johnson’s comments regarding the political balancing provisions at issue during 1897 convention). Detractors of the new appointment regime were further concerned that the
process “could permit the appointment of incompetent judges simply because they
belonged to a particular party” or could “deprive the electorate of influence over
the judiciary.” Friedlander, supra note 8, at 1149 (quoting Walsh & Fitzpatrick,
supra note 8, at 134).
12. See Adams, 922 F.3d at 170. The original political balance provisions acted
accordingly, stating that “appointments shall be such that no more than three of
the said five law judges, in office at the same time, shall have been appointed from
the same political party.” Friedlander, supra note 8, at 1149 (quoting DEL. CONST.
art. IV, § 3 (1897)).
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Democratic judicial candidate from consideration for vacancies on the supreme court, superior court, and chancery court.13
The five political balancing provisions of the Delaware constitution, as
read today, can be separated into two groups. The first group comprises
the first three provisions of article IV, section 3 and concerns the supreme
court, superior court, and chancery court.14 Each provision within the
first group not only limits the number of justices from one major political
party on each bench but also requires the remaining justices to be “of the
other major political party.”15 The second group addresses the composition of the Delaware Family Court and Delaware Court of Common
Pleas.16 Notably, in contrast to the first three provisions of article IV, sec13. See BOYER & RATLEDGE, supra note 7, at 105 (discussing the creating of the
Supreme Court of Delaware and amendments to article IV, section 3 of the Delaware constitution). Notably, Delaware was the last state in the country in 1951 to
create a state supreme court. Friedlander, supra note 8, at 1149.
14. See DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 3. In pertinent part, these provisions provide:
Appointments to the office of the State Judiciary shall at all times be subject to all of the following limitations:
First, three of the five Justices of the Supreme Court in office at the same
time, shall be of one major political party, and two of said Justices shall be
of the other major political party.
Second, at any time when the total number of Judges of the Superior
Court shall be an even number not more than one-half of the members
of all such offices shall be of the same political party; and at any time
when the number of such offices shall be an odd number, then not more
than a bare majority of the members of all such offices shall be of the
same major political party, the remaining members of such offices shall
be of the other major political party.
Third, at any time when the total number of the offices of the Justices of
the Supreme Court, the Judges of the Superior Court, the Chancellor
and all the Vice-Chancellors shall be an even number, not more than
one-half of the members of all such offices shall be of the same major
political party; and at any time when the total number of such offices
shall be an odd number, then not more than a bare majority of the members of all such offices shall be of the same major political party; the remaining members of the Courts above enumerated shall be of the other
major political party.
Id.
15. Id. The court in Adams referred to these provisions as containing a “major
political party component” by requiring justices on the supreme court, superior
court, and chancery court to be of one of the two recognized major political parties (i.e., Republican or Democrat). See Adams, 922 F.3d at 171.
16. See DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 3. The fourth and fifth provisions read:
Appointments to the office of the State Judiciary shall at all times be subject to all of the following limitations: . . .
Fourth, at any time when the total number of Judges of the Family Court
shall be an even number, not more than one-half of the Judges shall be of
the same political party; and at any time when the total number of Judges
shall be an odd number, then not more than a majority of one Judge
shall be of the same political party.
Fifth, at any time when the total number of Judges of the Court of Common Pleas shall be an even number, not more than one-half of the Judges
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tion 3, these two limit only the number of seats a single political party can
hold.17 The impact of these provisions are as distinct as the language that
comprises them. Namely, the bench of the supreme court, superior court,
and chancery court must be composed of a balanced number of registered
Republicans and Democrats. Justices on the family court and court of
common pleas, however, can be registered with any political party.
While the political balance requirement has existed since 1897, the
precise constitutional provision at issue in Adams—which was “modified to
exclude third party and unaffiliated voters from applying to serve as
judges”—was enacted only sixty-nine years ago.18 It requires the supreme
court to always be made up of three members of a “major political party,”
with the other two members being from “the other major political
party.”19 The rules are designed to ensure that one political party never
comprises more than a “bare majority” of any state court.20
Delaware governors rely on “judicial nominating commissions to
identify qualified candidates for judicial appointments.”21 The commission is made up of twelve members, eleven of whom are appointed by the
governor; the twelfth member is appointed by the Delaware Bar Association with the governor’s consent.22 When a judicial vacancy arises, the
public is notified that the judiciary seeks candidates from the political
party required to maintain the requisite partisan balance on the given
shall be of the same political party; and at any time when the total number of Judges shall be an odd number, then not more than a majority of
one Judge shall be of the same political party.
Id.
17. Id. Again, in Adams, the court considered the latter two provisions of article IV, section 3, as substantively separate from the first three, as the former contain only a “bare majority component” by limiting the overall number of justices
from a single political party. See Adams, 922 F.3d at 171.
18. Adams, 922 F.3d at 170 (discussing the party affiliation requirements that
now applied to applicants for the supreme court, superior court, and chancery
court); see also BOYER & RATLEDGE, supra note 7, at 105 (noting the “[u]nique features” of Delaware’s judicial appointment scheme—namely, the political balance
and affiliation requirements—were added in a 1951 amendment to the Delaware
constitution). The 1951 amendment created Delaware’s first independent court
of last resort. See BOYER & RATLEDGE, supra note 7, at 104. Until that point, no
permanent stable of supreme court judges existed; instead, judges “were . . . drawn
from other courts—namely the Court of Chancery and the Superior Court.” Id.
The Delaware legislature created the 1951 amendment in part to resolve that absence from Delaware’s judiciary. See id.
19. See DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
20. See Adams, 922 F.3d at 171; see also Epps, supra note 1 (detailing institution
of “bare majority” rule in order to “placate partisan opponents of the [supreme
court]” (first internal quotation marks omitted)).
21. Adams, 922 F.3d at 171.
22. See id. The commission is “politically balanced and comprised of both
lawyers and non-lawyers.” Id. In a 2017 executive order, Delaware Governor John
Carney affirmed the process by which individuals are named to the nominating
commission. See Del. Exec. Order No. 7 (Mar. 9, 2017), https://governor.delaware
.gov/executive-orders/eo07/ [https://perma.cc/PZ4E-JAMM].
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court.23 The commission provides the governor a list of three recommended candidates, who then must choose from those candidates or ask
the commission to generate a new list.24
Outside of Delaware, judges are commonly selected by gubernatorial
nomination, elections, or a hybrid process, resulting in “a dizzying assortment of methods . . . depend[ing] on the state, the level of court, and the
type of vacancy to be filled.”25 Most states use elections in some form to
create or maintain judicial positions.26 Twenty-six states, Delaware included, use gubernatorial appointments for initial terms based on a list
provided by a nominating commission.27 Delaware judges are confirmed
by the state senate for twelve-year terms, and can be reconfirmed with no
limit on the amount of terms they may serve.28
Unlike many other states, Delaware judges never face a retention election.29 For example, Maryland’s governor also nominates judges from a
23. Adams, 922 F.3d at 171.
24. See Del. Exec. Order No. 7, ¶ 7 (Mar. 9, 2017). If the governor chooses
not to nominate a candidate from the commission’s initial list of candidates, they
may ask the commission to submit at least three additional candidates within thirty
days. Id. The governor can request only one supplementary list unless the Delaware State Senate fails to confirm the selected candidate. Id. Should that occur,
another list is generated. Id.
25. Judicial Selection: Significant Figures, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., https://
www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/judicial-selection-significantfigures [https://perma.cc/AKB2-N5DF] (last visited Apr. 28, 2020) (detailing
methods of selecting state court judges used throughout United States, including
popular elections, gubernatorial appointments, and hybrid systems where governors nominate judges who are confirmed by portion of state’s legislature).
26. Id. (noting thirty-eight states use elections to either nominate or retain
judges). In sixteen states, judicial nominees to the highest court are initially selected by the governor and then retain their seats by running unopposed in retention elections. Id. In fifteen states, judges gain their seats by running in contested
nonpartisan elections, and in seven states, judges face a contested partisan election
where candidates run on a politically affiliated ticket. Id.
27. See id. (finding that in “a total of 26 states and D.C., the governor appoints
judges to their first term from a list of candidates provided by a nominating
commission”).
28. See Judicial Selection: An Interactive Map, BRENNAN CTR.FOR JUST., http://
judicialselectionmap.brennancenter.org/?court=supreme&state=de [https://
perma.cc/VV2N-7NXJ] (last visited Apr. 28, 2020) (showing, when selecting the
state of Delaware on the website’s interactive map, that when a Delaware judicial
seat opens following a complete term, due to the expiration of a term or a current
judge’s retirement, “the governor appoints a judicial candidate from a list provided by a judicial nominating commission” which “must be confirmed by a majority vote of the state Senate”).
29. See id. (noting, when selecting the state of Delaware on the website’s interactive map, that once a Delaware judge’s initial 12-year term has expired, the judge
“may stand for reappointment to additional 12-year terms in the same appointment process,” consisting of gubernatorial nomination followed by a senate confirmation). While uncontested retention elections “provide some insulation from
the negative aspects of contested elections,” they are seen as “a breakwater and not
an impenetrable seawall,” providing an added level of public scrutiny and accountability not present in non-electoral appointment processes. Larry T. Aspin, Reten-
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list generated by a nominating commission, but can ignore the commission’s recommendations and appoint someone from outside the list.30
Gubernatorial appointees must eventually run in a retention election
against outside candidates seeking that position.31 New Jersey’s appointment process is also similar to Delaware’s, but it lacks the mandatory partisan affiliation and political balance requirements at issue in Adams.32
While the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet addressed the constitutionality of those political requirements in the context of Adams, it has provided insight into the factors it considers when deciding whether politics is
a legitimate element of public employment. The Court decided whether
employers can consider political affiliation in civil service hiring and firing
decisions, finding that the constitutionality of an employee’s selection or
dismissal may turn on whether the individual’s role is “policymaking” in
nature.33 In Elrod v. Burns,34 a plurality of the Court determined that if an
employee is a policymaker, “the government’s interest in employee loytion Elections and Evaluations: A Response to Current Trends in Contested Judicial
Elections?, in FUTURE TRENDS IN STATE COURTS, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS. 104–05
(2007) (analyzing the use of retention elections to ensure judicial integrity).
30. See Judicial Selection: An Interactive Map, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., http://
judicialselectionmap.brennancenter.org/?court=Supreme&state=MD [https://per
ma.cc/SFE7-6LRZ] (last updated Apr. 28, 2020) (noting, when selecting the state
of Maryland on the website’s interactive map, that Maryland’s governor “receives a
list of candidates vetted and recommended by the judicial nominating commission
but is not required to select a candidate from the list”). While the Governor of
Maryland may elect not to nominate a candidate recommended by that state’s
nominating commission, the list of names submitted to the governor for consideration are made public. See Md. Exec. Order 01.01.2019.05(F)(12) (May 6, 2019)
(requiring the commission to “release this list to the public concurrently with submission of its report to the Governor”).
31. See Bryan Renbaum, Del. Cardin: Bill Would End Competitive Elections for Circuit Court Judges, MARYLANDREPORTER (Jan. 27, 2020), https://marylandreporter.
com/2020/01/17/del-cardin-bill-would-end-competitive-elections-for-circuit-courtjudges/ [https://perma.cc/D3VA-3DVR] (discussing Maryland’s judicial electoral
regime where circuit court judges “must face voters in competitive non-partisan
elections” where “they are rarely opposed,” while appellate court judges run in
retention elections and keep their seats so long as a majority of Maryland’s citizens
vote “yes” on their retention).
32. See Judicial Selection: An Interactive Map, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., http://
judicialselectionmap.brennancenter.org/?court=Supreme&state=NJ [https://per
ma.cc/N74P-TAPC] (last updated Apr. 28, 2020) (demonstrating, by selecting the
state of New Jersey on the website’s interactive map, that New Jersey judicial candidates must also be approved by the state senate, serving seven-year terms to Delaware’s twelve-year terms); see also Colleen O’Dea, Explainer: How Do Our Judges Make
It to the Bench in New Jersey?, NJSPOTLIGHT (June 3, 2014), https://www.njspotlight
.com/2014/06/14-06-02-explainer-how-judges-make-it-to-the-bench-in-new-jersey/
[https://perma.cc/4HRN-LVS3] (noting New Jersey governors have “traditionally
. . . kept a political balance among judges—nominating one Democrat for each
Republican”). For further analysis of New Jersey’s unofficial political balancing
standard, see infra Part IV.
33. See Adams v. Governor of Del., 922 F.3d 166, 177 (3d Cir. 2019) (discussing evolution of policymaking exception in Supreme Court jurisprudence).
34. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2020

7

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 4

892

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65: p. 885

alty” would allow a dismissal based on political affiliation in the proper
circumstances.35 Four years later, the Supreme Court in Branti v. Finkel 36
“moved away from Elrod’s policymaking distinction,” and the Court decided a more appropriate inquiry requires the hiring authority to demonstrate that a specific political affiliation is a necessary consideration for the
effective performance of an employee.37 The Third Circuit’s holding in
Adams—that judges are not policymakers and their employment cannot be
conditioned on their personal politics—contradicts other circuit courts of
appeals, which may deepen the divide in how the American judiciary as an
institution is perceived.38
II.

FACTS

AND

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff, James Adams, was a member of the Delaware State Bar and a
registered Independent.39 Adams coveted a position in Delaware’s judiciary, but as an Independent, he could not apply due to Delaware’s constitutional scheme excluding third-party applicants from most judicial
appointments.40 In the past, Adams tried to apply for positions on the
Delaware Family Court in 2009 and the state’s supreme court and superior
court in 2014.41
Returning to active status with the Delaware State Bar in 2017, Adams
once again became interested in serving on a Delaware bench.42 Around
this time, Adams read a scholarly article critically analyzing the state’s po35. See Adams, 922 F.3d at 177 (noting that whether an employee is classified
as “policymaker” should be determined by factfinder after examination “of the
employee’s responsibilities to determine whether or not he or she is in a policymaking position”); see also Burns, 427 U.S. at 372 (holding patronage dismissals
should be limited to policymaking positions).
36. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
37. Adams, 922 F.3d at 177 (arguing judgeships are political in nature but do
not fall within the policymaking exception, thus hiring judges based on political
affiliation may incur First Amendment scrutiny).
38. See id. at 180–81 (acknowledging conclusions by Court of Appeals for
Sixth and Seventh Circuits that judges qualify as policymakers for whom political
affiliation may be considered as necessary condition for judicial service); see also
Newman v. Voinovich, 986 F.2d 159, 163 (6th Cir. 1993) (“[J]udges are policymakers because their political beliefs influence and dictate their decisions on important jurisprudential matters.”); Kurowski v. Krajewski, 848 F.2d 767, 770 (7th Cir.
1988) (holding a governor, who is entitled to appoint judges with shared policy
views, may factor political affiliation into their decision).
39. Adams, 922 F.3d at 172. Once a registered Democrat, Adams changed his
political affiliation in 2017 after becoming disenchanted with Delaware Democratic Party’s “centrism.” Id.
40. See id.
41. Id. Adams was not chosen for family court commissioner in 2009. Id.
And as a registered Democrat in 2014, he was not able to apply for a supreme or
superior court position that strictly sought Republican candidates. Id.
42. Id.
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litical balancing provisions and the constitutionality thereof.43 This article, coupled with Adams’s longtime desire for judicial appointment, led
him to sue the governor of Delaware in February 2017.44
At the summary judgment stage, the governor argued that Adams
lacked standing to challenge the Delaware constitution’s provisions because he had not actually applied for an open judicial position in 2017.45
Adams, on the other hand, argued that the political balance provisions of
the state constitution violate the First Amendment’s Freedom of Association clause because they require a candidate to belong to a specific political party.46
In ruling on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, the
United States District Court for the District of Delaware was unpersuaded
by the governor’s standing argument. It held that Adams had standing to
challenge the first three political balancing provisions of article IV of the
Delaware constitution because they not only contained requirements limiting one political party to a bare majority of seats but also contained provisions limiting membership to Republicans or Democrats.47 While the
district court held that Adams lacked Article III standing to challenge the
last two provisions, it held he nonetheless had prudential standing to do
so.48 With regard to Adams’s arguments, the district court agreed that
Elrod’s policymaking exception was inapplicable and determined that the
provisions of article IV unconstitutionally predicated judicial employment
on political affiliation.49
III.

NARRATIVE ANALYSIS

On review, the Third Circuit first addressed the issues of standing that
the governor addressed in his motion for summary judgment. The court
determined that Adams had constitutional standing to challenge the first
three provisions of article IV, section 3 because they contained a “major
political party” component that inhibited his ability to serve on the su43. Id. Notably, the article questions whether Delaware could “enforce a state
law providing that no Independent or member of a minor party shall be appointed
to a judgeship.” Id. (quoting Friedlander, supra note 8, at 1154).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 172–73.
46. Id.
47. Id. Therefore, the district court found Adams’s application to the supreme court, superior court, or chancery court would have been futile because he
was not part of either major political party required. Id.
48. Id. Adams did not have Article III standing to challenge the last two political balancing provisions because they only contained a “bare majority” provision
and did not require applicants to be a member of either major political party;
therefore, his application would not have been futile. Id.
49. Id. The court noted that the district court not only relied on Third Circuit and Supreme Court case law, but also on the Delaware Judge’s Code of Judicial Conduct—all of which “emphasiz[ed] that a judge’s job is to apply, rather
than create, the law.” Id. For further discussion of the Elrod and Branti standard,
see supra Part II.
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preme court, superior court, or chancery court.50 The Third Circuit
agreed with the district court that Adams did not have constitutional
standing to challenge the latter two provisions of article IV, section 3,
those pertaining to the family court and court of common pleas.51 However, the district court erroneously found Adams’s prudential standing on
these two provisions conferred jurisdiction below.52 As a result, the court
had jurisdiction to hear his challenges only to the first three constitutional
provisions.53
Next, the Third Circuit analyzed whether the policymaking exception
applied to the first three provisions of article IV, section 3 of the Delaware
constitution. Informed by the Supreme Court’s decisions in Elrod and
Branti, the Third Circuit held that a judicial officer is not a “policymaker”
under the exception.54 “The purpose of the policymaking exception,” the
court noted, “is to ensure that elected officials may put in place loyal employees who will not undercut or obstruct the new administration.”55 According to the court, “[j]udges simply do not fit this description.”56 While
the governor argued that Delaware judges are de facto policymakers, the
50. Adams, 922 F.3d at 174. The “threshold issue” of constitutional standing is
“an essential component of subject matter jurisdiction” and therefore requires a
plaintiff to show “that he has: ‘(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.’” Id. at 173 (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v.
Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016)). The district court also concluded Adams
had constitutional standing to challenge these provisions even though he had not
applied for positions on these courts. Id. at 174 (noting “it would have been futile”
for Adams to apply for these positions as an Independent). The Third Circuit
agreed with the district court’s futility analysis, and the governor did not contest
Adams’s constitutional standing for the first three provisions of article IV, section
3. See id. at 175.
51. Id. at 175 (recognizing that Adams’s application to family court or court
of common pleas would not necessarily have been futile because they contain only
“a ceiling for members of the same political party”).
52. See id. at 175. The court admonished that prudential and constitutional
standing are not interchangeable. Id. Rather, prudential standing “is a ‘judicially
self-imposed limit[ ] on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.’” Id. (alteration in
original) (quoting Davis v. City of Philadelphia, 821 F.3d 484, 487 (3d Cir. 2016)).
53. Id. The court also concluded that it saw “no reason to ignore Adams’s
challenge to Article IV, Section 3 on prudential grounds.” Id. at 176.
54. Id. at 178. The court noted that, based on its own precedent, the “‘key
factor’ is whether an employee in that position ‘has meaningful input into decisionmaking concerning the nature and scope of a major program.’” Id. (quoting
Galli v. New Jersey Meadowlands Comm’n, 490 F.3d 265, 271 (3d Cir. 2007)). Informed by this test, the court had previously applied the political exception to a
number of positions including an assistant district attorney and city solicitor. See
id. (first citing Mummau v. Ranck, 687 F.2d 9, 10 (3d Cir. 1982); then citing Ness v.
Marshall, 660 F.2d 517, 520–22 (3d Cir. 1981)).
55. Id. (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 367 (1976)).
56. Id. The court observed that notions of judicial independence can be
found in the American Bar Associations Model Code of Judicial Conduct, the Delaware Code of Judicial Conduct, the Supreme Court of Delaware’s decisions, and in
article IV, section 3 of the Delaware constitution. See id. (“Article IV, Section 3
itself illustrates that political loyalty is not an appropriate job requirement for Dela-
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Third Circuit believed that “[t]o the extent that Delaware judges create
policy, they do so by deciding individual cases and controversies before
them, not by creating partisan agendas.”57
Having dismissed the governor’s first argument, the Third Circuit
considered whether the three constitutional provisions at issue were necessary to maintain political balance within the Delaware judiciary. According to the court, such political balance provisions “could be constitutional
if they are ‘narrowly tailored to further vital government interests.’ ”58
However, the court held that systematically denying any member of a political party other than the Republican or Democratic parties service on the
supreme court, superior court, or chancery court cannot be narrowly tailored to achieve a state’s interest in politically balancing its judiciary.59
The Third Circuit recognized Supreme Court precedent validating political balancing in state employment but distinguished these cases as primarily dealing with state policymakers.60
The court did not find that the supposed benefits of political balance
sufficiently justified article IV.61 Despite the evident popularity of the Delaware constitution’s political balance provisions, the governor could not
show that the current constitutional scheme was the “least restrictive
means of achieving political balance.”62
Finally, the court assessed whether the major political party requirement was severable from the other sections of the Delaware constitution.
The court held that “there is no question that the bare majority component is capable of standing alone . . . [b]ut . . . we do not think the two
components were intended to operate separately.”63 Therefore, the court
declared any provision of article IV, section 3 containing a major political
party component unconstitutional.64
ware judges. Delaware has chosen to considerably limit the Governor’s ability to
nominate judges on the basis of political expediency.”).
57. Id. at 179. To the extent the Sixth and Seventh Circuits disagreed with its
conclusion, the court argued that these circuits “conflate[d] an appointing authority’s ability to consider the political beliefs and ideologies of state employees
with that authority’s ability to condition employment on party loyalty.” Id. at 181.
58. Id. at 181–82 (quoting Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 74
(1990)).
59. See id. at 182.
60. See id. The Governor chiefly relied on Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, (1976),
as well as LoFrisco v. Schaffer, 341 F. Supp 743 (D. Conn. 1972), aff’d, 409 U.S. 972
(1972), and Hechinger v. Martin, 411 F. Supp 650 (D. D.C. 1976), aff’d, 429 U.S.
1030 (1977), in which the Supreme Court approved of two state statutes that attempted to achieve political balance in Connecticut’s boards of education and in
D.C.’s city council. See Adams, 922 F.3d at 182.
61. See id. at 183 (noting governor had described benefits of political balance
to State of Delaware and its apparent popularity in Delaware judiciary).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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Concurring with the majority decision, Judge McKee highlighted the
impact of the court’s decision on the future of the Delaware judiciary.65
Specifically, Judge McKee noted that Delaware’s political affiliation requirements “[p]aradoxically . . . institutionaliz[e] the role of political affiliation rather than negate[ ] it.”66 Despite this paradox and the court’s
invalidation of the constitutional provisions behind it, Judge McKee expressed confidence that Delaware’s “political and legal culture that will
ensure the continuation of the bipartisan excellence of Delaware’s judiciary.”67 Indeed, Judge McKee suggested that Delaware can nevertheless
achieve its “laudatory objectives” of political balance in the absence of constitutional provisions requiring such.68
IV.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

In order to justify the constitutional provisions mandating the balanced representation of Republicans and Democrats on its highest courts,
Delaware must demonstrate that the law is “narrowly tailored” to promote
a “vital state interest”.69 It is this determination, and the emphasis placed
by the Third Circuit on the former inquiry while neglecting the latter, that
is our focus. This Casebrief does not purport to be a comprehensive analysis of the Third Circuit’s opinion and does not attempt to answer the multicircuit question of whether judges fall under the “policymaker”
exception.70 Rather, this Casebrief offers a narrower critique of the political balance provision: without legally mandated political balance, can a
state maintain its claimed desire for judicial bipartisanship, or are partisan
politics bound to influence a judiciary without any such constitutional
protection?
The appointment practices used by one of Delaware’s neighbors suggest it is possible to maintain judicial bipartisanship through a voluntary
appointment process rather than a compulsory one. New Jersey does not
have constitutionally mandated political balance, but its governors have
“ ‘strictly adhered to’ [a] tradition that the seven-member [state supreme]
65. See id. at 185 (McKee, J., joined by Restrepo & Fuentes, JJ., concurring)
(writing separately “to add the perspective of someone who has served as a state
court judge in a jurisdiction that selects judges in general elections preceded by
partisan political campaigning”).
66. Id. at 185 (McKee, J., concurring).
67. See id. at 187 (McKee, J., concurring).
68. See id. (McKee, J., concurring) (reiterating court’s holding and suggesting
amendments may cure “constitutional infirmities”).
69. See id. at 183 (articulating judicial standard by which rules that “impinge[ ] an employee’s First Amendment association rights” are reviewed by
courts).
70. See id. at 181 (concluding that judges are not policymakers within meaning of “policymaking exception because affiliation with a particular political party
is not a requirement for the effective performance of the judicial role”). For further examination of the policymaking exception, which allows a judicial candidate’s political affiliation to be considered without violating the First Amendment,
see supra Parts II, III.
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court consist[ ] of four Democrats and three Republicans or vice versa.”71
After a seat opened in 2016, the New Jersey’s supreme court consisted of
two Democrats, three Republicans, and an Independent who was considered a Republican by virtue of her work in Republican administrations.72
When then-governor Chris Christie attempted to nominate another Republican to serve as the seventh member of the court, he ultimately acquiesced to political pressure from the state senate and nominated a
Democrat to the bench, thus, maintaining New Jersey’s unwritten practice
of judicial political balance.73 Not only is this an instructive example
about how judicial bipartisanship can survive absent a constitutional provision, but it demonstrates the ability to preserve balanced courts while allowing registered Independents to serve.74
The Third Circuit held that Delaware’s claimed interest did not justify
the unduly restrictive and broadly construed constitutional provisions.75
In arriving at this conclusion, the court pinpointed one major weakness in
the governor’s argument: “Even assuming judicial political balance is a vital Delaware interest, the Governor must also show that the goals of political balance could not be realized without the restrictive nature of Article
71. Friedlander, supra note 8, at 1145 (quoting John B. Wefing, Two Cheers for
the Appointment System, 56 WAYNE L. REV. 583, 597–98 (2010)). James Adams
brought the challenge to Delaware’s constitution that is the subject of this
Casebrief after reading Friedlander’s work. See Adams, 922 F.3d at 172. Friedlander acknowledges the reputation and quality of Delaware’s judiciary, but appeals to the state’s legal community not to allow “good results [to] blind [them] to
the dubious constitutionality of categorically disqualifying Independents and members of minor parties.” Friedlander, supra note 8, at 1164.
72. Friedlander, supra note 8, at 1145 (“New Jersey’s example instructs that a
bipartisan judiciary can be maintained over time by political will alone, without the
legal compulsion of a statutory partisan balance requirement.”).
73. See id. (citing Karen Yi, Christie Nominates Democrat to Supreme Court, ASBURY
PARK PRESS, https://www.app.com/story/news/politics/new-jersey/chris-christie/
2016/04/11/christie-nominates-democrat-supreme-court/82899000/ [https://
perma.cc/B3JS-7BXH] (last updated Apr. 12, 2016, 7:30 AM)). After Governor
Christie’s initial attempt to nominate a Republican failed, Christie compromised
with the state senate’s Democratic leader, who “assured Christie that if he found a
Democrat he was comfortable with, [the senator] would afford the nominee a fair
hearing and an up or down vote.” See Yi, supra.
74. Admittedly, New Jersey is not a perfect analog. New Jersey’s state senate
was controlled by Democrats, who could vote to reject any judicial nominee, creating a natural political tension with the Republican, Christie. See Yi, supra note 73
(discussing the “bitter standoff between Democrats and Christie over the high
court vacancy”). Delaware has been an even more reliably “blue” state than New
Jersey, and it seems unlikely Delaware governors would face much opposition to
their judicial appointees from a state senate that has been controlled by Democrats
since 1975. See Friedlander, supra note 8, at 1140 (detailing makeup of Delaware’s
politics and noting it has had Democratic governors since 1993, and a Democraticcontrolled state senate since 1975).
75. See id. at 182 (stating court “need not dwell long on whether Delaware
possesses a ‘vital state interest’ in a politically balanced judiciary, because Delaware’s practice of excluding Independents and third-party voters from judicial employment is not narrowly tailored to that interest”).
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IV, Section 3, and this he has failed to do.”76 Thus, the court identified an
inescapable flaw in the governor’s argument: political balance provisions
are not necessary to further the state’s interest in maintaining a bipartisan
judiciary. Even assuming judicial political balance is in fact a “vital state
interest,” states do not needs laws to achieve that goal.77 The governor
failed to recognize that “Delaware has institutionalized the role of political
affiliation” through its constitutional traditions, rather than in its constitutional language.78 In his concurrence, Judge McKee argued these customs are “so firmly woven into the fabric of Delaware’s legal tradition . . .
that [they] will almost certainly endure in the absence of” constitutional
protection.79 Therefore, it follows that the constitutional provisions locking in mandatory judicial bipartisanship are not truly necessary to protect
a vital state interest.
Instead of tackling this larger philosophical point, the Third Circuit
chose the path of least resistance and identified the lack of a narrowly
tailored rule as the fundamental deficiency in Delaware’s argument. Focusing solely on this inquiry allowed the court to strike down the constitutional provision while avoiding a conclusion as to whether judicial
bipartisanship is a “vital interest.” Notably, Judge McKee believed that
question “may be decided in a future case.”80 Although Judge McKee described Delaware’s “interest in achieving a judicial system that is as fair in
fact as it is in appearance” as “laudatory,” his fellow judges did not indicate
whether Delaware’s interest in a balanced judiciary would sway them in
situations where the means are more narrowly tailored.81
Bipartisanship for bipartisanship’s sake seems unlikely to withstand
constitutional scrutiny, but the court indicated that “judicial impartiality,”
if achieved through a narrower law without sweeping limitations on courts’
political makeup, may pass muster.82 If Delaware amended its constitu76. Id. at 183.
77. See Friedlander, supra note 8, at 1151–52. Friedlander describes a number
of reasons that Delaware’s political balance provisions have lasted besides that they
have been constitutionally mandated. See id. These factors include: (1) the fact
that no one political party has dominated Delaware in the twentieth century; (2)
the state’s importance to U.S. corporate law, incentivizing politicians to resolve
corporate disputes practically; and (3) the lack of judicial retention elections. See
id.
78. See id. at 185 (McKee, J., concurring) (discussing the governor’s argument
that constitutional protections were necessary to politically balanced judiciaries).
For further discussion of Judge McKee’s concurrence, see supra Part III. See also
Devera B. Scott et al., The Assault on Judicial Independence and the Uniquely Delaware
Response, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 217, 244 (2009) (noting that Delaware’s “great pains
[in] ensur[ing] a balanced and independent judiciary” creates a public perception
of “Delaware courts as fair arbiters of justice”).
79. Adams, 922 F.3d at 185 (McKee, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 187 (McKee, J., concurring).
81. See id. at 187 (McKee, J., concurring). For further discussion of Judge
McKee’s concurrence, joined by Judges Restrepo and Fuentes, see supra note 65.
82. See id. at 183 (voicing concerns about “conflating party balance with judicial impartiality”); see also Epps, supra note 1 (“The bare-majority rule means only

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol65/iss4/4

14

DeFilippis and Epstein: On the Straight and Narrowly Tailored: The Third Circuit Walks a

2020]

CASEBRIEF

899

tion to allow Independents to become judges, but maintained the requirement that members of a major political party could comprise no more
than half-plus-one of a given court, the court leaves open the question of
whether such a provision would be sufficiently narrow.83 By failing to address this question in Adams, the court invites a future challenge on this
basis if Delaware alters, rather than abandons, its judicial appointment
practices.
The Third Circuit also failed to discuss a significant point raised by
Judge McKee in his concurrence. Not only do “[s]cholars and academics
routinely refer to Delaware’s courts as the preeminent forum for litigation,
particularly for cases involving business disputes,” but “[m]embers of the
Delaware bench credit the political balancing requirement for at least part
of this success.”84 Maintaining the Delaware judiciary’s sterling reputation
in the business community is a concern among those who support Delaware’s current constitutional provisions, a motivation left underanalyzed
by Judge McKee’s Third Circuit colleagues.85 The status of Delaware’s judiciary as a desirable home for corporate litigation—and by proxy, the
state of Delaware’s place itself as a desirable home for corporations—is
important subtext of Adams’s challenge. This principle underlies the significance of the case to Delaware’s legal and economic environments.
VI.

IMPACT

Judge McKee expressed confidence that Delaware’s bipartisan judicial
tradition would continue, even absent a constitutional requirement manthat members of a given party can be considered for some seats and not for
others—a less-serious invasion of free association.”).
83. Some believe that allowing mandatory judicial political balance is constitutionally palatable, so long as it is not accompanied by the political affiliation
provision struck down in Adams. See Epps, supra note 1. Nevertheless, the political
balance requirement also functions as a failsafe should a challenge like Adams’s
succeed, which would allow Delaware to functionally continue its judicial appointment practices in the tradition it has enjoyed since 1951. The Third Circuit
agreed, holding that because the two provisions were designed to operate together, neither could withstand Adams’s suit. See Adams, 922 F.3d at 184 (“Only
with the (unconstitutional) major political party component does the [political
balance] provision fulfil its purpose of preventing single party dominance while
ensuring bipartisan representation.”). The political balance requirement may not
be as flagrantly violative of the Freedom of Association clause, but its existence still
allows one to be disqualified from a judicial appointment based on political affiliation. See id. at 173.
84. Adams, 922 F.3d at 186 (McKee, J., concurring).
85. See Brief for Petitioner at 32, Carney v. Adams, 140 S. Ct. 602 (2019) (No.
19-309) (discussing the importance of Delaware judges’ influence in crafting important business law doctrines). Governor Carney emphasized that “fiduciary-duty
law, cited by courts around the world” and “Delaware’s internationally emulated
business judgment rule . . . [are] product[s] of judge-made common law.” Id.
Carney’s brief argued that the Delaware “judiciary’s reputation—particularly in
corporate law—has made this small State a beacon for business and business litigation all over the country.” Id. at 38.
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dating it.86 Delaware’s former governors appear to be less certain. In
their amicus brief written in support of Governor Carney, five former governors—three Democrats and two Republicans—seem resigned to the fact
that future governors will no longer appoint judges of the opposing political party if the practice is not required by the state constitution.87
The decline of judicial bipartisanship itself would be most consequential for Delaware’s position at the center of corporate law. The state
openly touts its reputation as a distinguished forum for business litigation.88 If the Third Circuit’s decision is upheld, and the political balance
provisions remain unconstitutional, there may be a significant impact on
Delaware’s place and reputation in the corporate law community.89 Delaware is the legal home of “more than one million companies—including
two-thirds of the Fortune 500”—which would be directly impacted by any
upheaval to the state’s judicial appointments framework.90
Proponents of Delaware’s regime warn that partisan balancing
schemes for other varieties of public servants may be collateral damage in
the event the provision is rejected.91 Other agencies, like “election, redistricting, and judicial nominating commissions,” may have their processes
86. See Adams, 922 F.3d at 187 (McKee, J., concurring).
87. See Brief for Former Governors of Delaware as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 8, Carney v. Adams, 140 S. Ct. 602 (2019) (No. 19-309) (acknowledging that “cross-party appointments in the wake of the ruling below will dwindle, if
not disappear”).
88. See Why Businesses Choose Delaware, DEL. CORP. L., https://corplaw.delaware
.gov/why-businesses-choose-delaware/ [https://perma.cc/R5WH-D5K6] (last visited July 26, 2020) (claiming “through a bipartisan, merit-based selection process,
the Court of Chancery is flexible, responsive, focused, and efficient”). Delaware
even publishes literature designed to promote the state as a preeminent legal forum for corporations. See, e.g., LEWIS S. BLACK, WHY CORPORATIONS CHOOSE DELAWARE 1 (2007) (stating “Delaware courts and, in particular, Delaware’s highlyrespected corporations court, the Court of Chancery” have created judicial “prestige” and “cachet”).
89. See Brief for Former Governors of Delaware as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, supra note 87, at 9 (discussing the impact on American corporate legal
jurisprudence, based substantially on Delaware cases). Not only do Delaware’s former governors think upholding the Third Circuit may “cause[ ] long-term corporate planners to take their business elsewhere,” but they also believe that “entities
may choose to incorporate in different jurisdictions throughout the country,
thereby irreparably fragmenting the nation’s currently unified corporate law.” Id.
90. Brief for the Chamber of Commerce for the United States of America as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 3, Carney v. Adams, 140 S. Ct. 602 (2019)
(No. 19-309) (discussing why the longstanding political balance provisions have
resulted in Delaware’s place at center of American corporate law).
91. See Brief the Campaign Legal Center as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 3, Carney v. Adams, 140 S. Ct. 602 (2019) (No. 19-309) (advocating for a
narrow holding, should the partisan balancing provision be held unconstitutional,
because striking it down “could jeopardize the political equilibria holding together
countless agencies, commissions, and panels outside of Delaware—equilibria that
voters, through their elected representatives, have expressly authorized”).
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upended as well.92 While the Third Circuit did not indicate a desire to
apply its holding to administrative or quasi-judicial entities, it did discuss
political balancing statutes in other contexts.93
In the short term, Governor Carney could blunt any potential ramifications by proactively announcing his intention to continue adhering to
Delaware’s political balance and affiliation provisions, even without a constitutional mandate. While it seems likely the people of Delaware would
want to keep the “First State’s” place as the home of American corporate
jurisprudence, it is possible this action would put the governor at odds
with an overwhelmingly Democratic electorate who might want more
judges from their own party.94 Alternately, Adams—who bemoaned the
Delaware Democratic party’s move to the “center” as his reason for registering as an Independent—is potentially correct about his characterization of Delaware Democrats. And as centrists, Delaware Democrats would
likely support the status quo if it results in maintaining Delaware’s judicial
reputation, even if it came at the expense of a more politically progressive
judiciary.95
The Third Circuit’s holding rests primarily on the basis that the “major political party component” is unconstitutional standing alone, and because it is not severable, the entire provision must also be struck down.
Thus, it seems likely that Delaware would seek to amend its constitution to
maintain the political balance component. Such a revision would allow it
to mandate an appointment process that adopts New Jersey’s unwritten
rule allowing Independents to serve as judges while considering them
members of the party they “lean” closest to.96 In the meantime, Delaware
may be faced with the loss of a judicial appointment tradition that has

92. See id. at 4 (warning that an “overly broad ruling that the First Amendment prohibits any partisan considerations in filling offices that are independent
from the appointing authority would jeopardize nearly 150 years of practice at the
federal and state levels, threaten a range of governmental entities, and undermine
legislatures’ efforts to shape democratic institutions as they see fit”).
93. See Adams v. Governor of Del., 922 F.3d 166, 182 (3d Cir. 2019) (“[T]he
Supreme Court affirmed two district court decisions approving political balancing
statutes governing elections for a state’s boards of education and the District of
Columbia’s city council, respectively.”).
94. See Delaware Governor Results: John Carney Wins, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2017,
11:24 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2016/results/delaware-governorcarney-bonini [https://perma.cc/3KWM-FQXM]. Carney was elected in 2016 with
58.3% of the vote, beating his Republican opponent by nineteen points. See id.
95. See Adams, 922 F.3d at 172 (noting Adams’s frustration “with the centrism
of the Democratic Party in Delaware”).
96. For further discussion of New Jersey’s longstanding, though unofficial,
tradition of maintaining a partisan balance on its supreme court, see supra Parts I,
IV. For further discussion of the potential constitutional issues that may accompany political balance provisions by themselves, see supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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endured since 1897, forcing it to serve as an untested battleground for the
often unspoken, but ever-present, tension between the judiciary and
politics.
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